Administration and the Courts by Hart, James
88
Administration and the Courts
By JAMES HART
THE relation of the courts to bu-reaucracy cuts across every branch
of American law: constitutional and
statutory law, criminal and civil law,
the common law and equity. It is ac-
cordingly so complex, and so involved
in technical distinctions, that no at-
tempt will here be made to explore its
details. The present purpose is rather
to capture, if that be possible, a few
glimpses of its broad significance.
The clue to that significance is to be
sought in the role of the judiciary in
our constitutional system. The Consti-
tution is formally the source of a legal
order or regime of law; and this regime
of ’law can be made effective in action
only if, its application to any particular
situation being disputed, there exists an
independent third party which is em-
powered authoritatively to settle the
dispute when, but only when, it is ap-
pealed to by either of the disputing
parties.
Such independent third parties are
the courts. Their third-party character
is necessary to protect one disputant
from having the other impose a settle-
ment by acting as judge in his own
cause. It is underlined by the fact
that they may not take the initiative,
but must sit passively until some plain-
tiff initiates before them some case
against some defendant. Its bulwark
is their independence, which is secured
by such means as the tenure of judges
and their immunity from criminal and
tort liability for the manner in which
they exercise their judicial powers.
The application of the law to a par-
ticular situation includes determining
the facts of that situation by following
the applicable rules of law. These
rules may prescribe that the facts shall
be those agreed upon by the parties to
the dispute. They may establish as the
facts those well pleaded by one of those
parties and admitted upon demurrer by
the other. They may provide that the
facts shall be those found by judge or
jury upon the basis of the evidence of-
fered and allowed, including the testi-
mony of witnesses for both sides, in
accordance with the law of evidence.
They may also provide that the facts
shall be those found, upon the basis of
notice and a hearing, by a quasi-judicial
tribunal, provided those facts are upon
challenge found by the court to be sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the
light of the whole record or such por-
tions thereof as may be cited to the
court.
THE REPEATED PATTERN
In all branches of the law, and re-
gardless of whether the government or
an administrative official or agency is
party plaintiff or party defendant, the
role of the courts is in essence the same.
The central pattern always consists of
a plaintiff, a defendant, and a court as
the independent third party settling the
dispute by applying the law to the
legally determined facts.
In a criminal case, the role of the
plaintiff falls primarily to the prosecut-
ing attorney, and the defendant is al-
ways the accused. But the role of the
court is the same, whether the accused
is a storekeeper indicted for murdering
his wife or an official indicted for a
misdemeanor in office.
In a tort case, the plaintiff may be
the owner of a horse, and the defendant
a neighbor who allegedly has injured
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the horse out of spite. The defendant
may, however, be a health officer who
has killed the horse without notice on
the ground that it had the glanders.
In the law of contracts, the plaintiff
may be a merchant who is seeking to
collect from the defendant on goods de-
livered. That defendant may be an
ordinary customer; but he may be an
official who, in ordering registration
supplies, acted ultra vires because the
county was not subject to the registra-
tion laws, but who is alleged to have
used apt words to bind himself per-
sonally. This is not to say that the
law is the same for a contracting agent
of government as for the agent of a
private individual or firm. It is to say
that the role of the court is in principle
the same in both instances.
In equity, the plaintiff or complain-
ant may be the owner of water-front
real property who seeks to have the
defendant or respondent enjoined from
threatened action which he claims will
work him irreparable injury. The de-
fendant may be a boat company whose
planned wharf the plaintiff alleges will
obstruct entrance to his property; but
he may be the Secretary of Defense,
whose planned harbor improvements
the plaintiff claims are in excess of his
statutory authority.
Or take two of the extraordinary
common-law writs. The plaintiff or
relator may seek a mandamus against
a municipal official to compel him to
issue a license to engage in the hard-
ware business, on the ground that under
a city ordinance the only condition for
the issuance of such a license is the
payment of a fee which has been ten-
dered and refused, and that it is there-
fore the ministerial duty of the official
to accept the fee and issue the license.
Or the plaintiff or applicant may seek to
have a writ of habeas corpus issued to
the immigration officer who holds him
in custody under a warrant for his ar-
rest and deportation as an alien illegally
in the United States, when the plaintiff
claims to be a foreign-born son of a
native-born citizen.
Still again, the parties may be a
manufacturing company and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board; but
either may be plaintiff or defendant.
For, the Board having served upon the
company an order to cease and desist
from specified unfair labor practices,
under the statutory review provisions
of the governing statute the company
may apply to a national Court of Ap-
peals for review, and the Board may
apply to the same court for enforce-
ment, of the order.
In the illustration last cited, which-
ever party moves first, the function of
the court is the same: to affirm, modify,
or set aside the order according to
whether the Board’s findings as to the
facts are or are not supported by sub-
stantial evidence, its procedure has or
has not been lawful, and its order is or
is not in all respects of a legally per-
missible scope. The court’s duty is no
more to throttle the Board than it is to
enforce its order without question, no
more to curb the Board than to give it
free rein. It is rather to adjudicate as
between the parties by applying the law
to the particular situation without fear
or favor, and accordingly to grant en-
forcement to the Board or relief to the
company.
This, moreover, is typical of the duty
of every court in every case brought be-
fore it, irrespective of all differences in
detail.
This responsibility of the courts as
independent third parties is a crucial
feature of a regime of law. It is ad-
mittedly such in the criminal and pri-
vate law. Administrative law being
taken to embrace all parts of the law
which govern the relations between ad-
ministrative agencies and private per-
sons or organizations, it is presently
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pertinent to sum up the principal rea-
sons why it is such in this area also.
A FEATURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEM
Judicial review of administrative ac-
tion is a time-honored feature of our
constitutional system. Hence, the im-
portance of continuity with the past as
a starting point of orderly improvement
establishes a presumption in favor of
continuance of the institution. Such
review is, moreover, in one form or an-
other, a feature of the constitutional
systems of the leading Western nations.
Hence, the fact that it is the product of
a commonly felt need among countries
blessed with popular government and
the reign of law strongly reinforces the
presumption.
In affirmative support of the pre-
sumption, the rationale of the institu-
tion is as applicable today as it was in
simpler times. Indeed, it is underlined
by the administrative expansion of the
last two decades. For it affirms that
the settlement by a court as an inde-
pendent third party of a dispute be-
tween a private party and an adminis-
trative agency is called for in the public
interest.
On the one hand, administrators are
invested with authority over persons
and property; and human beings so in-
vested are apt, whether from over-
zealous devotion to their task or from
less worthy motives, to exceed or abuse
their lawful powers. Protection of pri-
vate interests against such excess or
abuse is an indispensable factor in any
civilized conception of the public in-
terest. For such protection, however,
it is not enough that the law define the
scope of such powers and prescribe that
they be exercised reasonably in respect
alike to substance and to method. It
is essential that enforcement of the law
be in the hands of the courts as inde-
pendent third parties.
On the other hand, administrative
powers over persons and property are
necessary means to reasonable statutory
ends of so limiting private freedom as to
safeguard vital interests of the commu-
nity as a whole. If, therefore, the exer-
cise of these powers is found by the
courts to be in content and procedure
within the law, the public interest re-
quires that the administrative deter-
minations be sanctioned by coercive ju-
dicial decrees quite as clearly as in the
contrary event it requires that the pri-
vate interests concerned be protected.
Whichever way the courts decide,
moreover, the result obtains from the
fact that it is produced by an independ-
ent third party a powerful moral sanc-
tion. Not least when the stakes are
high, this moral sanction is promotive
of orderly government, for it greatly
facilitates compliance on the part of the
losing party and acquiescence on the
part of those interests in society which
are disappointed at the outcome.
To such reasoning the objection may
be raised that the supposed regime of
law is illusory, since the law is what
the judges say it is, and hence that it is
indefensible to vest in men who are not
politically responsible the authority in
their final discretion to restrict the exer-
cise by administrative commissions of
economic controls authorized by repre-
sentative legislatures.
It is now generally recognized, to be
sure, that the courts are far from being
mere automatons, mere passive mouth-
pieces of a pre-existing law which is al-
ways unmistakable in its general terms
and perfectly clear in its bearing upon
all possible situations. This is not to
deny that in many parts of the law
there is a substantial core of certainty
in the application of the law to run-of-
the-mine situations. It is to affirm,
however, that throughout the law many
hypothetical situations can be stated,
and actual situations are constantly
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arising, to which the application of the
law is uncertain, and will remain so
until the court of last resort shall have
spoken. It is further to affirm that
notably in the dynamic field of adminis-
trative law there are whole areas of
confusion.
Nor is that all. It is the precedents
of the courts which have made the com-
mon law and equity what they are; and
while the courts, in interpreting the
written law, are limited by the language
used, they fix the meaning of that lan-
guage for all cases except those which
patently come within its intent.
THE SUPREME COURT
Now it may be that the degree of un-
certainty in the law is exaggerated by
centering attention upon courts of last
resort; for theirs is the task of resolv-
ing legal uncertainties. This is espe-
cially true of the Supreme Court of the
United States, to which appeal of right
can be taken only in limited classes of
cases, and which otherwise selects, by
granting or denying petitions for certio-
rari, the cases which raise new or doubt-
ful questions of law it deems it impor-
tant to pass upon. Small wonder, then,
that this court is often divided.
It is further to be noted in passing
that, while a Supreme Court decision
which makes new law is retroactive
with respect to the given situation, it
increases the certainty of the law for
the future-a result which is in itself
advantageous for all concerned-and
that, however wrongheaded such a de-
cision may seem to some informed crit-
ics, it is at least a reasoned decision
which at the worst overemphasizes prin-
ciples which judges and other men have
long cherished.
In the last analysis, of course, the an-
swer to the objection which has been
raised must be that in administrative
law, as in the criminal and private law,
the independent third-party role of the
courts is too precious to be abandoned
even though it involves the fallible judg-
ment of men. If those men are now
thought to have &dquo;liberal&dquo; predilections,
the predilections of their predecessors
were as consistently &dquo;conservative.&dquo;
ALTERNATIVE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
The best defense of this role of the
courts is to contemplate the alternative.
In administrative law that alternative
would be to allow administrators to de-
termine, subject to political controls,
their own powers. Such political con-
trols are new legislation, Presidential
direction, and political pressure. New
legislation would depend upon the con-
tingencies of politics and the delays of
legislative procedure and, once enacted,
would have the meaning given it by
those it was designed to limit. Presi-
dential direction does not presently ap-
ply to several administrative tribunals
for the significant reason that, their
duties being so analogous to those of
courts as to be considered quasi-judicial
and their orders being subject to only
limited judjcial review, Congress has
made them plural bodies whose mem-
bers have overlapping terms and may
not be removed by the President be-
cause he disagrees with their decisions.
So vast has the national bureaucracy
become that, even in relation to those
agencies which are directly responsible
to the President, his span of control
stretches very thin ; while, in any case.
Presidential direction is by nature pri-
marily political rather than remedial.
It is notorious that political pressure
from Senators and party chiefs spells
favoritism rather than the insurance of
impartiality. Political control would
thus offer no specific or adequate protec-
tion to private interests against admin-
istrative orders, and might actually
cause or aggravate administrative abuses.
With administrative authority otherwise
unrestrained, two great evils would be
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likely to arise. On the one hand, offi-
cial decisions which were not liable to
challenge before an independent third
party would lack respect, receive at
best reluctant compliance, and often be
evaded through political influence and
with a clear conscience. On the other
hand, removal of the possibility of such
challenge would be removal of restraints
which that possibility now makes whole-
somely operative.
BROADER ISSUES
The objection which has been under
examination raises still broader issues
when applied to the bearing upon ad-
ministrative law of a feature of our
constitutional system which does not
exist in England or France: judicial
review of statutes. Our courts may
hold an administrative determination
invalid not only because it is unau-
thorized by the governing statute, but
also because that statute is itself un-
constitutional. This unconstitutionality
may of course relate as well to the ad-
ministrative as to the other provisions
of the statute. In order, moreover, to
avoid a constitutional issue, the courts
may give an exceedingly narrow inter-
pretation of statutory administrative
powers. It is thus not possible for
American legislatures, as it is for the
British Parliament, to define the scope
and methods of administrative action,
and to narrow or eliminate judicial re-
view thereof, without these enactments
being subject to invalidation at the
hands of the courts.
Opposition to judicial review of stat-
utes centers upon a ground which has
no special reference to administrative
law. From democracy conceived as an
absolute dogma, and from a formalistic
identification with democracy of what-
ever representative institutions bring
forth, there is deduced the conclusion
that every enactment of such institu-
tions must be given the force of law.
The subject is too large for treatment
in this place; but a few remarks may
be ventured, with administrative law
especially in mind. The first premise
of civilized government is the sacred-
ness of every human personality as
having been in some sense made in the
image of God. From the conclusion
that in the long run government is more
apt to conform with this premise if con-
flicts of interest are resolved only with
the consent of a representative assem-
bly chosen by universal suffrage in free
elections and with free discussion,
rather than by any sort of traditional
or self-appointed elite, it by no means
follows that the authority to govern,
even with the consent of such an as-
sembly, is in any civilized society un-
limited.
Government is civilized only if the
resolution of conflicts of interest is lim-
ited by recognition that all men and all
groups and lawful organizations of men
have mutual interests in the basic civil
liberties, in procedural and substantive
fair play for all, and in having disputes
arising out of particular situations ad-
judicated by an independent third
party.
Recognition of these limits may of
course be provided in more than one
manner. It may be so firmly embedded
in the habitual moral convictions of a
people that the resulting moral re-
straints are on the whole adequate. If
it is not to some extent so embedded,
it cannot be secured by any purely
artificial means.
AMERICAN ATTITUDES
We Americans stand somewhere be-
tween these extremes. The essential re-
straints have high authority from our
past to support them; and there are
courageous men in every generation to
appeal to that authority. But we also
have habits of irresponsibility which en-
able the passions of the moment to over-
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ride civilized restraints. It is probably
well, therefore, that the constitutional
limitation of due process, or fair play,
is embodied, as obligatory even upon
representative assemblies, in the funda-
mental law of the nation, and hence is
to be applied as law when a court sits
as an independent third party to settle
a dispute between an administrator who
relies upon a statutory provision and a
private party who claims that that pro-
vision authorizes a denial of fair play.
Similarly, if judicial review of ad-
ministrative action is a sine qua non
of civilized government, should the su-
preme law of the land not ensure that
the independent third party shall have
untrammeled authority to exercise it?
And how can it ensure this unless it
gives that independent third party the
last word on the scope of review which
constitutionally must be allowed by
statute? 
’
THE ROLE OF CRITICISM
To justify judicial review in principle
is not, however, to place it beyond criti-
cism. General principles do not decide
borderline cases. The choices which
the Supreme Court is constantly mak-
ing are choices of statesmanship, and
judicial statesmanship, like political
statesmanship, can falter and fail.
The suggestion may be hazarded that,
aside from its deplorable stand in the
matter of utility rate-making by admin-
istrative commissions, the old Court’s
most grievous failure, which justly
brought judicial review into disrepute
and almost inevitably led to the crisis
of 1937, concerned administrative law
less than such subjects as freedom of
contract and dual federalism.
The new Court has corrected those
errors, whether or not by going too far
it is not possible here to inquire. It
has also upheld Congress in devolv-
ing upon administrative agencies pow-
ers which, in the scope of their discre-
tion, are in sum impressive, and to
many alarming. Yet for the Court to
refuse to sanction the vesting of such
administrative powers, or so to control
their exercise as to hamstring adminis-
trative action as a means to permissible
statutory ends, would be to defeat with
one hand policies it declared constitu-
tional with the other. It would be to
deny to Congress the &dquo;necessary and
proper&dquo; means of carrying into execu-
tion its delegated powers. If our once
individualistic democracy has been in-
creasingly socialized, surely the devil is
neither Congress nor the Court, but the
industrial-technological revolution.
What has been said makes apparent
the urgent importance of judges’ of all
grades being men of sensitive conscience
and exceptional wisdom and of their
having their minds and consciences ad-
vised by the most searching criticism of
their work by philosophers as well as
lawyers and dissenters from the bench,
exponents of the humanities as well as
social scientists. It is, however, always
to be remembered of and by the critics
that theirs too is a fallible human
judgment.
Nor is it to be forgotten that judicial
statesmanship is of a different order
from political statesmanship. The cri-
teria which the Supreme Court and its
critics should consciously apply in ad-
ministrative law are implicit ins the
rationale of judicial review of adminis-
trative action. It is the task of this
independent third party to weigh in
the scales of judgment conflicting ends
which are always represented in the ad-
ministrative law cases it decides by the
parties at its bar. One of these ends is
to have specific enforcement in indi-
vidual cases of the statutory and con-
stitutional limits of administrative pow-
ers. The other end is that the govern-
ing process be not rendered ineffective
by undue judicial interference.
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To say this is not to furnish a for-
mula for the ready-made solution of
particular problems; but it is the first
lesson of wisdom that all such supposed
formulas are illusory. It is, in truth,
but to state a dilemma; but it is the
second lesson of wisdom that the prob-
lems of life always appear as dilemmas.
Without this realization men are apt to
seize one horn without even consider-
ing the other, and thus to doom them-
selves to one-sided judgment.
In conclusion, a word to the layman.
Were examination of administration and
the courts now to proceed from the
realm of generality to such specific
questions as the methods, scope, and
timing of judicial review, he would
doubtless be surprised by two things.
One would be, how many are the forms
which the indicated dilemma in fact
takes; and the other would be, how
difficult the choices often become for
anybody who does not focus his atten-
tion upon one of the competing ends to
the exclusion of the other. The judi-
cial task of maintaining a balance by
sustaining administrators here and re-
straining them there is one of the high-
est that can be assigned to mortal men.
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